The area fire departments and fire districts in the Northwest Central Dispatch System (NWCDS) 9-1-1 coverage area in the northwest suburbs of Chicago, are apparently going the wrong direction with technology by encrypting fire radio talk groups while failing to deploy an effective crowdsourced Automated External Defibrillator (AED) alert system and app, known as PulsePoint. The app is designed to save victims of Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest (OHCA). The PulsePoint app’s crowdsourcing approach in a timely manner connects people trained in CPR that happen to be near a patient experiencing a cardiac event, the closest AED among a registry of public AED locations, and the cardiac arrest victim’s precise location. Once a 9-1-1 call is placed that confirms a public cardiac emergency, the PulsePoint system and PulsePoint app aims to bridge the critical gap in the first minutes of a cardiac emergency, where survival odds drop by 7–10% per minute without intervention. The initial release for PulsePoint was 2011.
Multiple studies, implementation reports, and public health endorsements indicate that PulsePoint AED is effective in enhancing community responses to OHCA via faster AED deployment, higher bystander involvement, and resulting improved survival rates of Out of Hospital Cardiac Arrest (OHCA).
In a study of public cardiac arrest involving 840 total PulsePoint dispatches in Pittsburgh, 64 (7.6%) were for actual OHCA associated with a resuscitation attempt, and these 64 incident results were revealed as follows. Forty-one (64.1%) of those 64 OHCA events involved witnessed cardiac arrest, 38 (59.4%) received bystander CPR, and 13 (20.0%) of these patients had an AED applied prior to EMS arrival. Twenty-seven (39.7%) had an initial shockable rhythm, and 31 (48.4%) patients achieved Return of Spontaneous Circulation (ROSC) in the field indicating the heart started working on its own again. The 20% AED deployment compares to about 5-10 percent nationally in areas without PulsePoint. The 48.4% ROSC compares to a national rate of less than 10% for survival to hospital discharge.
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) endorses the use of the technology for a citizen response in conjunction with community bystander cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and automated external defibrillator (AED) programs. When deployed in combination, survival from sudden cardiac arrest in both rural and metropolitan communities can be significantly improved, according to the IAFC.
Additionally, PulsePoint is expanding its application for medical emergencies beyond the registry of locations of public AEDs. In June 2019 PulsePoint extended the AED registry to include other collocated resources including naloxone (e.g., Narcan®) and epinephrine (e.g., EpiPen®), along with Bleeding Control Kits.
Some well-known fire agencies that have implemented PulsePoint include Anaheim Fire & Rescue, Atlanta Fire Rescue Department, Champaign Fire Department, District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, Hilton Head Island Fire Rescue, Las Vegas Fire & Rescue Department, Los Angeles Fire Department, Los Angeles County Fire Department, Miami Beach Fire Department, Milwaukee Fire Department, Naperville Fire Department, Orlando Fire Department, Rockford, Sacramento Fire Department, Sacramento Metropolitan Fire District, San Diego Fire-Rescue Department, San Diego Fire-Rescue Department, South Metro Fire Rescue (Colorado), Tucson Fire Department, and over 4500 additional fire agencies in the United States.
Fire agencies listed above are working to engage the public for greater EMS success, while our fire agencies in the northwest suburbs of Chicago and the Northwest Central Dispatch System 9-1-1 center are loading the balance toward secrecy, chaos and unnecessary complications and complexities.
Leaders that CARDINAL NEWS has informally questioned indicated that PulsePoint would not be that effective, and is therefore not worth implementing in the northwest suburbs of Chicago. Instead, the fire agencies in the Northwest Central Dispatch System (NWDS) have indicated it is worth implementing a plan to encrypt and silence public information involving fire, rescue and EMS emergencies by encrypting fire radio talk groups. Police radio talk groups have been encrypted since June 2013.
Encryption to Affect …
Arlington Heights
Barrington
Barrington & Countryside Fire
Buffalo Grove
Elk Grove Village
Hoffman Estates
Inverness Fire
Mount Prospect
Palatine
Rolling Meadows
Schaumburg
Streamwood
Wheeling
The majority of NWCDS Executive Committee Members (namely fire chiefs and police chiefs) voted ahead of the board members’ vote to encrypt fire radio talk groups on Thursday, March 20, 2025 (ahead of the board meeting vote). According to sources, the Executive Committee members were initially in a heated conflict over the decision, but eventually arms were twisted, and only two fire chiefs voted against encrypting fire talk radio groups. All of the police chiefs and fire chiefs accountable to village managers or city managers eventually conformed to the decision to encrypt. Then the NWCDS Board (namely village managers or police or fire chiefs voting on their behalf) voted unanimously to encrypt fire radio talk groups on Thursday, March 20, 2025.
The pro-encryptors argue that awareness of fire department emergency assigned locations jeopardizes the security of police officers, firefighters, and paramedics. The pro-encryptors also argue that encryption of fire radio talk groups also prevents awareness of private medical information of individuals calling for help. Currently the names of individuals and other sensitive information, even at private residences, are not announced during dispatch of emergency calls. One concern is whether authorities will think it is OK to provide sensitive information over the radio once the fire radio talk groups are encrypted. Continue reading (look for section header: Encrypted Radio Use Intermingled with the Public – FAIL) to find out why this could be a problem.
Public citizen opponents of fire talk radio encryption argue that village and city authorities plan to use encryption in their community to hide violent crime, hide crime trends, hide unsafe conditions, hide negative conditions in the community, hide the rise of mental illness in their community, hide homeless conditions, hide the rise of drug abuse, hide agendas that cause influx of homeless and mentally ill individuals, hide improper actions including negligence involving firefighters and paramedics, hide improper behavior of village or city officials (e.g., DUI, DUI crashes), hide incidents that could lead to discovery of local government corruption, protect business interests that are negatively affected by bad news, hide general failures of local government, and generally keep the public uninformed so they have less proof or facts to use to organize against harmful village or city agendas.
Encryption of fire and emergency medical services (EMS) radios is implemented to protect PHI (Protected Health Information) transmitted during EMS responses. The PHI includes patient medical histories or identities, which aligns with HIPAA’s privacy rule. However, HIPAA explicitly does not require encryption for wireless or emergency medical radio communications, even if the communications can be intercepted by publicly available radio scanners. Implementation of encryption of radio communications by paramedics in EMS situations creates a scenario where encryption—motivated by HIPAA compliance—introduces unnecessary operational drawbacks.
Following are the key disadvantages, relating HIPAA’s goals of safeguarding PHI while enabling timely and effective healthcare delivery.
Impaired Interoperability with Other Agencies
Encrypted radios often fail to communicate seamlessly with neighboring jurisdictions, mutual aid partners, or agencies using older, unencrypted, or incompatible systems. This is a critical issue for fire and EMS operations, which frequently involve multi-agency responses (e.g., mass casualties or cross-border incidents). Delays in sharing PHI or coordinating care can endanger patients, paramedics and other first responders.
While encryption protects PHI from public eavesdroppers, it hinders the rapid exchange of health information between providers, undermining HIPAA’s broader emphasis on efficient care coordination. For EMS, this could mean delayed hospital handoffs or incomplete patient data sharing, increasing breach risks through errors rather than unauthorized access.
In a 2015 Washington, D.C., subway tunnel emergency, fire department encryption contributed to radio failures, hindering coordination with transit agencies and resulting in one death and dozens injured. An emergency response agency in Mansfield, MA, disabled encryption to ensure compatibility in the event of potential large-scale mass casualty incidents requiring mutual aid.
Paramedics have been investigated—and in some cases, disciplined or even prosecuted—for HIPAA violations, but cases haven’t involved dispatch or radio communications.
Common HIPAA Violations by Paramedics:
Sharing patient information on social media. Posting photos, videos, or even details of a call can violate HIPAA, even if names aren’t mentioned. For example, a paramedic posts a photo of a car crash victim’s scene on Facebook or Instagram.
Talking about patients in public or with unauthorized individuals who aren’t involved in the care of a patient. Discussing patient cases with family, friends, or coworkers who aren’t involved in care.
Accessing patient records without a valid reason — snooping. Looking up patient information out of curiosity rather than for treatment purposes.
Failing to properly secure documentation, such as leaving a run sheet or patient care report where others can see the document.
Unnecessary Burden Without HIPAA Mandate
Since HIPAA does not mandate encryption for EMS radio transmissions, agencies may over-engineer compliance, leading to avoidable implementation challenges. This includes retrofitting systems or training staff, wasting personnel energy to encryption objectives while diverting resources from other HIPAA priorities like securing data storage or access controls.
The HIPAA privacy rule prioritizes “reasonable safeguards” for PHI, but radios in emergencies are exempt from encryption requirements due to their real-time, interceptable nature. Encrypting them creates a false sense of security while exposing agencies to audits, which prompts the question of the necessity and effectiveness of such measures.
Fire Departments report high costs (hundreds of dollars per radio) and compatibility issues with antiquated systems still in use by many first responders.
Increased Risk of Communication Failures in High-Stakes Scenarios
Accidental mode switches (accidentally turning encryption on/off) or system glitches can isolate users, as seen in a 2006 Arlington, VA, incident where an officer’s encryption toggle caused chaos among responding units. For EMS, this could mean paramedics unable to relay vital signs, allergies or other emergency medical information in real-time. The chaos could also cause delayed efforts to request additional ambulances or calls for urgent assistance from the police in violent situations.
Such failures could lead to PHI mishandling (e.g., verbal disclosures over unsecured backups) or delayed treatment, violating HIPAA’s security rule by compromising the integrity and availability of health information during emergencies.
Improper Understanding of Privacy Features by Authorities and Personnel Regarding HIPAA and other Sensitive Information — the Insecure Nature of Multi-Point Broadcast of Encrypted Radios
Encrypted radios work great for privacy until a radio is stolen or involved in an unauthorized distribution; or an unauthorized audience is within hearing range of the encrypted radio’s speaker.
Consider the use of an encrypted radio among military tank communications in a military conflict. The military radio works fine for keeping the enemy unaware of the strategy of the other side until a soldier with an encrypted radio is killed, and his radio is stolen by the enemy.
The same goes for Northwest Central Dispatch System, where encrypted radios could be stolen or distributed without proper authorization. Keeping the NWCDS radios pure and secure, which is likely impossible, also requires personnel time and energy. Also, a task such changing the encryption key could be burdensome to make sure fire agencies outside the NWCDS system are properly updated. This is time and energy that is lost for other tasks that keep the system operating well to properly serve the residents in the Northwest Central Dispatch System area. Maintaining the complexity of the encrypted system will also be difficult when key NWCDS employees are absent or retire.
“Encrypting the radios will be a complex process, particularly ensuring good communication with non-NWCDS fire departments.”
— NWCDS minutes May 15, 2025 and June 19, 2025
Northwest Central Dispatch System (NWCDS) has created a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) regarding the encryption key which will be given to neighboring municipalities and fire districts outside the NWCDS service area. The NDA awareness begs the questions … Has NWCDS seriously considered the increased risk of unauthorized radio encryption key distribution? How far out is the perimeter (inclusive of municipalities and fire districts) of your authorized encryption key distribution? Larger disasters or terrorist attacks with casualties in the multiple hundreds or thousands will certainly exceed the assigned authorized encryption key distribution within the digital (P25) radio system used by NWCDS and the nearby perimeter community systems just outside the NWCDS area. This could force radio communications to be transmitted over less secure VHF communication available with the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS). VHF radio communications can be easily jammed or disabled with interference by pranksters or terrorists. This actually happened several times on Chicago Police Department’s older UHF radio system before the police department switched to a P25 system.
Encrypted Radio Use Intermingled with the Public – FAIL
When paramedics are intermingled with the public in everyday situations (and using their encrypted radios), there will be instances when audio will be coming out of their radio speaker, and the audio can be heard by anyone standing nearby. Therefore, all of NWCDS, municipality, and fire district expenses to encrypt and all of their efforts involving personnel time and energy to maintain the encrypted radio system are defeated by the simple matter that no encryption key is required by the human ear to hear the sound emanating from the encrypted radio’s speaker. We can all hear your encrypted radio audio once it’s coming out of a nearby radio speaker. This breach includes people standing next to paramedics in the check out line getting groceries at the grocery store, paramedics standing in a crowd at a football game, people taking a tour of the fire station, criminals listening while being transported to the hospital, bystanders at a crash scene or a fire scene, and people listening in their single-family home where a patient is being treated and prepared for transport by paramedics when an unrelated call gets dispatched on the Fire/EMS encrypted radio talk group.
Reduced Operational Transparency and Public Trust
Encryption limits public or media access to non-sensitive response details, potentially eroding trust in fire and EMS agencies.
While protecting PHI is core to HIPAA, excess encryption may conflict with public health transparency needs, such as during community-wide incidents — mass shootings, school shootings, aircraft crashes, tornado disasters, and terrorist attacks. This can induce scrutiny over whether agencies are properly balancing privacy with accountability.
What’s really more secure for police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and the people they are serving … transmitting sensitive information with encrypted radio communications that are compromised by nature; or operating with unencrypted radio communications in conjunction with transmitting sensitive information using better technology designed for one-to-one communications, such as encrypted mobile telephone voice communications or using encrypted SMS texting or other types of data terminals? Using an encrypted radio with multi-point broadcast to deliver sensitive patient information or security information is inferior to using the one-to-one technology of cell phones or text messaging in every day EMS communications. Text messaging is far superior for transmitting complex information involving patient medical histories compared to hearing patient history over a radio because the information may be heard incorrectly, may be too complex to comprehend audibly, and cannot feasibly be recalled audibly for review and confirmation compared to reviewing a data screen displaying patient medical history.
Following are the NWCDS Board Members who voted unanimously to encrypt fire radio talk groups on Thursday, March 20, 2025 …
Randy Recklaus (Village Manager Arlington Heights) called for the motion, and Jon Sfondilis (Village Manager Wheeling) seconded the motion.
Randy Recklaus (Village Manager Arlington Heights), Chief John Christian for Scott
Anderson (Village Manager Barrington), D/C Brian Spolar for Dane Bragg (Village
Manager Buffalo Grove), Matthew Roan (Village Manager Elk Grove Village), Eric Palm (Village Manager Hoffman Estates), Sam Trakas (Village Administrator Inverness), Chief Mike Eterno for Michael Cassady (Village Manager Mount Prospect), Reid Ottesen (Village Manager Palatine), Joe Wade (City Administrator Prospect Heights), Rob Sabo (City Manager Rolling Meadows), Brian Townsend (Village Manager Schaumburg), Sharon Caddigan (Village Manager Streamwood), Jon Sfondilis (Village Manager Wheeling).
Following are the NWCDS Executive Committee Members (namely fire chiefs and police chiefs) who voted to encrypt fire radio talk groups on Thursday, March 20, 2025 (ahead of the board meeting vote). Only two fire chiefs voted against encrypting fire talk radio groups (Inverness Fire Chief Rich Kurka and Barrington Countryside Fire Chief Scott Motisi).
Nick Pecora (Arlington Heights Police Chief),Lance Harris (Arlington Heights Fire Chief), Dave Daigle (Barrington Police Chief), John Christian (Barrington Fire Chief), D/C Brian Spolar for Brian Budds (Buffalo Grove Police Chief), Dave Dorn (Elk Grove Police Chief), Richard Mikel (Elk Grove Fire Chief), Kasia Cawley (Hoffman Estates Police Chief), Alan Wax (Hoffman Estates Fire Chief), Kyle Ingebrigtsen (Inverness Police Chief), Mike Eterno (Mount Prospect Police Chief), John Dolan, (Mount Prospect Fire Chief), Bill Nord (Palatine Police Chief), Pat Gratzianna (Palatine Fire Chief), Milo Derman (Prospect Heights Police Chief), John Nowacki (Rolling Meadows Police Chief), Pete Sutter (Rolling Meadows Fire Chief), Bill Wolf (Schaumburg Police Chief), Jim Walters (Schaumburg Fire Chief), Shawn Taylor (Streamwood Police Chief), Mike Meyer (Streamwood Fire Chief), D/C Al Steffen for Jamie Dunne (Wheeling Police Chief), Scott Salela (Wheeling Fire Chief).
SOURCES:
Smida T, Salerno J, Weiss L, Martin-Gill C, Salcido DD. PulsePoint dispatch associated patient characteristics and prehospital outcomes in a mid-sized metropolitan area. Resuscitation. 2022 Jan;170:36-43. doi: 10.1016/j.resuscitation.2021.11.007. Epub 2021 Nov 11. PMID: 34774964.
PulsePoint
pulsepoint.org
